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RECENT DECISIONS
Another unresolved issue implicit in the holding of the instant
case concerns the standard to be applied in determining who is
sufficiently indigent to warrant this immunity from imprisonment.
In Saffore, the defendant was apparently completely without funds
and property. The Court, presented with such a clear case of
indigency, was not required to devise any more explicit standard
than the word "indigent." In closer cases, where varying degrees
of poverty are presented to the courts, some more specific test will
have to be developed. Certainly, this definition of indigency will
have to be reconciled with the "indigency" that gives a criminal
defendant the right to state-provided counsel. Even persons with
a limited amount of money, who are deemed sufficiently solvent
to afford competent counsel, but who exhaust their financial re-
sources to secure one, appear to be entitled to the immunity from
imprisonment for failure to pay fines under the holding of the
instant case.
As an immediate consequence of the instant case, the attention
of the criminal courts will be refocused on the proper purpose of
any confinement they impose in attempting to enforce a fine. Im-
prisonment in lieu of payment can only be justified when the
criminal can afford to pay the fine. This procedure was designed
to punish those with ample means by exacting of them a legisla-
tively determined sacrifice in money proportionate to the serious-
ness of their crime. Knowingly transforming this monetary obliga-
tion into an unavoidable additional incarceration cannot be justified.
Clearly the Court was correct in determining that the criminal must
be capable of paying the fine before he can be imprisoned for his
"refusal" to pay it.
TAXATION - INTEREST DEDUCTION - TRANSACTION MUST BE
ECONOMICALLY PUmOsIVE TO QUALIFY FOR INTEREST DEDUCTION.
- Petitioner, a sweepstakes winner, attempted to reduce her tax
liability by creating a large prepaid interest deduction. Borrowing
almost one million dollars, she purchased treasury notes which,
in turn, were pledged to secure the loans. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that, even though the transaction was not
a sham, the interest deduction was not allowable under Section 163
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 since the sole purpose of
petitioner's acts was tax avoidance. Goldstein v. Commissioner,
364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
With certain exceptions, Section 163 of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that the deduction of interest must be supported by
(1) an indebtedness, (2) interest on the indebtedness, and (3)
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the payment or accrual of the interest within the taxable year.'
The development of this section has been left almost entirely
to the courts since the pertinent Treasury Regulations do not
provide an interpretive guide. The courts have generally held that
as long as there is a genuine indebtedness, the interest deduction
is allowable.2 This is true regardless of the nature of the expense
or the purpose for which the proceeds of the indebtedness are
utilized. Such indebtedness, furthermore, need not serve a business
purpose, or even be reasonable.3  Due to the broad language
of section 163, many taxpayers have attempted to use the interest
deduction as a method of avoiding or decreasing their tax liabilities.'
The courts have opposed such attempts and have generally dis-
allowed the interest deduction 5 by placing elaborate interpretive
limitations upon the simple language of section 163.
For purposes of analysis, these tax avoidance "schemes" may
be categorized as either "annuity" or "treasury note" plans. In
the former cases, the taxpayer purchases annuities from an insurance
company, paying only a nominal cash sum and giving nonrecourse
notes secured by the annuity for the balance. The taxpayer then
prepays a substantial amount of the interest on the indebtedness.
The interest prepayment significantly raises the excess or loan
value of the annuity which taxpayer immediately borrows from the
insurance company, again prepaying the interest on this indebtedness.
These "borrowings" and "interest" prepayments are repeated each
year until the annuity is surrendered to the insurance company
as a set off to the cash value of the annuity against the principal
amount of the loan thereby cancelling the annuity contract. Thus,
the prepayments of interest accelerate the loan value of the annuity
but the concurrent borrowing of this accelerated loan value allows
taxpayer to recoup almost all the purported interest prepayments.,
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a). But see INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,§§264, 265(2), respectively disallowing certain amounts paid in connection
with insurance, endowment and annuity contracts or tax-exempt income.
24 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOME TAxAT o 26.01 (1960 ed.).
8 Ibid.4 1n the typical case, a taxpayer will become liable on a large indebted-
ness, the proceeds of which are put into high-grade investments such as
bonds, annuities, or government notes. The taxpayer then uses the securities
purchased as collateral for the indebtedness and prepays the interest. Since
the rate of return on the collateral is less than the interest on the indebted-
ness, the taxpayer shows a pre-tax economic loss. However, after deducting
from his income the prepaid interest, he has a post-tax economic gain. See
19 VAND. L. REv. 194 n.1 (1965).
5 See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Diggs v.
Commissioner, 281 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960);
Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959), affirming 30 T.C.
1178 (1958).
ISee Diggs v. Commissioner, supra note 5; Weller v. Commissioner,
270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960).
[ VOL. 41
RECENT DECISIONS
In Knetsch v. United States,7 the United States Supreme Court
disallowed the interest deduction on such loans from insurance
companies. The Court inquired into whether or not the transaction
created an "indebtedness" within the meaning of section 163.
Clearly disregarded, as immaterial, was the trial court's determina-
tion that the taxpayer's " 'only motive in purchasing these . . .
bonds was to attempt to secure an interest deduction.'" 1 The
Court stated that a taxpayer has the right to decrease the amount
of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them,
by any means the law permits.9 Motive is immaterial because
"the question for determination is whether what was done,
apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute had
intended." 10 In examining "what was done" here, the Court saw
the form of an annuity contract that would yield substantial
payments at maturity. However, this form "was a fiction" since
taxpayer's borrowings kept the cash value, on which the annuity
payments depend, negligible."' Therefore, the taxpayer's trans-
actions "did 'not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to
reduce his tax . . ' " 12 What the taxpayer "was ostensibly 'lent'
back was, in reality, only the rebate of a substantial part of the so-
called 'interest' payments." 13 The Court concluded that the trans-
actions did not create an indebtedness but were a sham.
Notably, the Court did not state that "indebtedness," to fall
within the section, must carry a qualification as to the purpose
for which the obligation is incurred. The case, however, has been
said to stand for the principle that, in annuity cases, the trans-
action must have commercial substance or a business purpose to
support the tax deduction.1"
However, in John Loughran,15 the taxpayer borrowed from
a bank the purchase price of annuities which he then pledged as
security with the bank. The taxpayer paid interest on this loan
and borrowed from the bank amounts equal to the excess loan
value of the annuities over his indebtedness. Although the taxpayer
had no right to annuity benefits because he borrowed the full
amount of the loan value and could derive no pre-tax gain from
such an undertaking, the tax court allowed the interest deduction.
7 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
8 Id. at 365. (Emphasis added.)
9 Ibid. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
20Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960), quoting from
Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 9, at 469.
11 Knetsch v. United States, supra note 10, at 366.
12 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
13 Ibid.
14 See 0' Connor, Knetsch Means Interest Is Allowable Only If Loan Has
Real Business Purpose, 14 J. TAXATION 160 (1961).
1t 19 T.C.M. 1193 (1960).
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The court distinguished this case from prior annuity cases
where the insurance company itself was the lender. In Loughran
the lender was an independent bank and, therefore, there was a
genuine indebtedness. The distinction is between a three-party
transaction and a two-party transaction.
The courts have consistently analyzed the net effect
of the two-party transactions, such as in Knetsch, and, if there
is no economic benefit to the taxpayer, they have refused to find
a genuine indebtedness.
Unlike the simplicity of the factual patterns in the annuity cases,
the treasury note cases have presented highly sophisticated transactions
for judicial scrutiny. Notable among the cases involving the purchase
of treasury notes was Eli D. Goodstein.'6 There, the taxpayer
purchased ten million dollars worth of treasury notes by paying
fifteen thousand dollars in cash to his broker and borrowing the
remainder. He then gave his note to the lending institution and
pledged the treasury notes as security. The taxpayer paid the
lending institution the periodic interest charges on his outstanding
promissory note, which amount he immediately received back in
the form of a loan for which the taxpayer again gave a note. The
tax court disallowed the deduction for interest on taxpayer's
promissory note. Relying on the "form versus substance" doctrine
utilized in Knetsch, the court held that the total transaction was
devoid of substance and should be ignored for tax purposes.17
The court found, inter alia, that: (1) taxpayer's transactions were
collusive shams arranged by taxpayer's broker; (2) the treasury
notes were purchased and sold in almost one transaction wherein
no actual money passed on behalf of taxpayer; (3) the lending
institution had no actual money to lend; (4) taxpayer never had
either actual ownership or possession of the treasury notes; and
(5) the lending institution never actually held the treasury notes
as collateral. 8 In the court's view, the whole matter of "interest"
was merely an empty bookkeeping device to create the illusion of
interest on a purported indebtedness.' 9
Significantly, the "form versus substance" rationale followed
by the Goodstein court subsequently induced courts, scrutinizing
mere variations of the tax-saving device utilized by Goodstein,
to strongly indicate that an interest deduction, in treasury note
cases, requires a business purpose or profit motive.20 It should be
16 30 T.C. 1178 (1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
17Id. at 1190.is Id. at 1187-89.
19 Id. at 1188.
20 George G. Lynch, 31 T.C. 990, aff'd, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959);
Leslie Julian, 31 T.C. 998, aff'd sub nom. Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F2d
867 (2d Cir. 1959); Egbert 3. Miles, 31 T.C. 1001 (1959). See Doukas,
Though Tax-Saving Is Only Motive, Interest Is. Deductible, IRS Concedes,
14J. TAxAooN 292 (1961).
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noted, however, that both the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 21
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,22 did not require
that there be a business purpose in order for there to be an
interest deduction in cases where treasury notes were involved2
The next significant development in this area was the land-
mark case of L. Lee Stanton.2 4 In Stanton, the taxpayer pur-
chased treasury notes on the open narket with funds borrowed from
independent banks. He gave the banks his personal recourse notes
and pledged the treasury notes as collateral. Factually, Stanton
was similar to numerous other tax avoidance schemes which were
disallowed by the courts. As in previous cases, the taxpayer had
little hope of a profit except in terms of a tax saving. There was,
however, one important distinction, i.e., in Stanton there was a
genuine indebtedness involved. The Commissioner attacked the
deduction on the grounds that the taxpayer's sole purpose was tax
avoidance and the transaction had neither a business purpose nor a
profit motive. The tax court, in allowing the deduction, stated
that "Congress has repeatedly considered and ultimately rejected
limitations somewhat comparable to the one now urged by the
Commissioner." 
25
The court concluded that, since Congress had failed to act,
the tax court lacked authority to require that a transaction be
entered into for profit rather than for personal or non-business
purposes, or merely to obtain tax benefits, in order that an interest
deduction be allowed.2 6
The court distinguished the prior treasury note cases 27 relied
upon by the Commissioner on the ground that in those cases there
was no true indebtedness "but merely collusive shams to create a
supposed appearance of indebtedness on which supposed interest
was paid.''-'
The court also distinguished the annuity cases in which
the taxpayers... had purchased annuity contracts and borrowed money
from banks to prepay . ..premiums and then [borrowed the full loan
21 Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (lst Cir. 1959), affirming
30 T.C. 1178 (1958). The court of appeals affirmed on the alternative
theory relied upon by the tax court Since taxpayer was on a cash basis,
the giving of a promissory note did not satisfy the statutory requirement of
payment.22 Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.), affirming 31 T.C. 998
(1959). The court affirmed on the sham theory, i.e., no true indebtedness
existed.23 Doukas, supra note 20, at 293.
2434 T.C. 1 (1960).
2. Id. at 7.
26 Ibid.
27 The court cited to the Goodstein, Julian, Lynch, and Miles cases.
2 Supra note 24, at 10.
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value of the anuuity and] . . . then used a part of this money to pay
off the loans at the banks. The interest on the bank loans was not in
controversy. The taxpayers were disallowed claimed deductions for
'interest' on the amounts they allegedly borrowed from the insurance
companies, since no money was in effect loaned to them by the insurance
companies. 29
Subsequent tax court cases have followed Stanton in focusing on
the "genuine indebtedness" theory. 0 It seems clear that Stanton
stands for the principle that in order for there to be an interest
deduction for commercial transactions there is no need that there be
a business purpose or profit motive as long as there is a genuine
indebtedness."1
In the instant case, the taxpayer, as in Stanton, purchased
treasury notes on the open market by borrowing from independent
banks by pledging the treasury notes as collateral and giving her re-
course note for the purchase price. Taxpayer then prepaid sub-
stantial interest charges on her note and claimed them as a deduction.
The Court of Appeals, while affirming the tax court's disallowance
of the deduction, rejected the determination that the transaction did
not create a genuine indebtedness. Several factors compelled the
Court to reach this conclusion. First, the lending institutions were
independent financial institutions. Second, the loan transactions
did not return the parties, within a few days, to the position from
which they started. Third, the banks retained significant control
over the future of the loan arrangements. For example, the banks
could, with thirty-days notice, demand that the collateral be in-
creased or that the loan be liquidated entirely. Fourth, the notes
signed by taxpayer were with recourse, rendering the taxpayer
personally liable, if necessary, for deficiency of collateral. 2 Even
though there was a genuine indebtedness, the Court disallowed the
deduction because the taxpayer's sole motive was tax avoidance.
The Court pointed out that the transaction was economically
unsound and unprofitable. Congressional intent, the Court opined,
was to encourage purposive activities financed through borrowing.
A deduction is allowable even though the taxpayer's motives are
mixed. There is, however, no requirement that the deductible
interest serve a business purpose, that it be ordinary and necessary
or even that it be reasonable. But some substance, beyond a mere
deduction, is required. 8  Therefore, the Court held that section 163
29 Supra note 24, at 10-11.
80 Sadie S. Friedman, 34 T.C. 456 (1960); Jack L. Sherman, 34 T.C. 303
(1960); Fabreeka Prods. Co., 34 T.C. 290 (1960).
31 See Doukas, supra note 20, at 294.
8 2 Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 738-39 (2d Cir. 1966).
ss Id. at 741.
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"does not permit a deduction for interest paid or accrued . . .
that can not with reason be said to have purpose, substance or
utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences."3 4
Since the Court of Appeals conceded the genuineness of the
indebtedness, the instant case is in opposition to Stanton
and Loughran where the tax court interpreted section 163
literally. While the prime consideration continues to be the exist-
ence of indebtedness,3 once it is established, the court will enlarge
its inquiry to determine whether the taxpayer's motive is solely tax
avoidance.
In reaching its holding, the Court relied on three prior annuity
cases.36 While each of these three cases contains strong indications
that a legitimate purpose is required, they involved a two-party
annuity arrangement. As such they do not appear to be sound
precedent for the holding in the instant case in which three parties
were involved. In three-party transactions, the loan arrangement,
being completely independent, the courts have been able to find a
genuine indebtedness. Once it is established that a taxpayer has
changed his position by incurring an actual debt and has actually
received the funds, it is clear that the interest payment is in
substance what it appears to be in form, i.e., the cost of the use
of money. Judicial consideration of the transaction should end
at this point since section 163 merely requires a genuine indebtedness.
Clearly, a court should not engraft upon a statute a prohibition
which was not specified by Congress.3 7 Since section 163 does not
place any restrictions on the purpose of the indebtedness, it is quite
possible that the Supreme Court might take a different view of the
transaction in the instant case than did the second circuit. The
case of Commissioner v. Brown 8 squarely stands for the sound
judicial policy that the courts should not accomplish by decision
what Congress has failed to accomplish by legislation. It would
appear that the Court in the instant case has violated this
policy.
34 Id. at 740.
35 See Barnett v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1966); Ippolito v.
Commissioner, 364 F2d 744 (2d Cir. 1966).361Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Diggs v. Commissioner,
281 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960); Weller v. Com-
missioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960).
37 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965). The Brown
decision prompted five judges to dissent in the tax court decision of the
instant case. See 44 T.C. 284, 300-05 (1965).
s380 U.S. 563 (1965).
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